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One Vote, Two Winners:
Team-Ticket Gubernatorial Elections and
the Need for Further Reform
T. QUINN YEARGAIN*
Historically, governors and lieutenant governors were
elected in separate elections. This frequently meant that governors and lieutenant governors of different parties were
elected, undermining the democratic legitimacy of gubernatorial succession. But when New York adopted team tickets
in 1953, it ignited a flurry of similar changes nationwide.
Today, most states with lieutenant governors elect them on
a team ticket with governors. And, since the initial adoption
of team tickets, several other trends—specifically, trends
away from separate primaries and toward post-primary selection—have emerged in how lieutenant governors are
elected.
Despite the significance of these changes, however, they
remain largely unexplored by the academic literature. Accordingly, this Article sets out to remedy that omission. It
addresses the move to team tickets—including explaining
why the move occurred when it did, the chronology, and the
legislative history—and the subsequent adoption of specific
lieutenant-gubernatorial election procedures. It explores
both trends and ultimately argues for the adoption of an
election procedure that maximizes democratic legitimacy.
*
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Larson, and Tori Simkovic, Junior Staff Editors—for their excellent edits on this
piece.
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INTRODUCTION
In U.S. presidential elections, the nominees of the two major
parties each select running mates to a significant amount of media
attention.1 After the presidential primaries are concluded, vice-presidential search committees are formed, vetting takes place, and prospective candidates and their proxies participate in behind-thescenes wrangling.2 The process ends with a slick rollout of the newly
minted vice-presidential nominee, their nomination at the party’s

1

Joseph Uscinski, Smith (and Jones) Go to Washington: Democracy and
Vice-Presidential Selection, PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 58, 58 (2012) (“Every four
years, not only American citizens, but spectators worldwide watch as . . . presidential nominees discuss, consider, and finally choose their vice-presidential running mates. The media, both domestic and international, relentlessly cover the
selection processes preceding the nominating conventions.”).
2
Nora Kelly Lee, Choosing the Veep of Your Dreams, ATLANTIC (Apr. 23,
2016).
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national convention, and if everything goes according to plan, no
harm to the presidential nominee.3
At the state level, the process is different—and considerably
more muted. Not every state has a lieutenant governor, and not all
of those that do allow their gubernatorial nominees to select a running mate after the primary.4 But when the process operates like a
presidential election in miniature, the gubernatorial nominee selects
a running mate to significantly less media attention and, in all likelihood, to the apathy of the state’s voters.
Despite the facial similarities between presidential and gubernatorial elections, the current state of gubernatorial elections is a
messy and crowded arena. Governors, as political institutions, have
undergone immense change since the early days of the United
States. Although most governors in the original thirteen colonies
were indirectly elected by state legislatures—either as a formal matter or from the failure of any candidate to win a majority, throwing
the election to the legislature—these constitutional provisions were
amended over the course of the nineteenth century to make gubernatorial elections more democratic.5 At the same time, lieutenant
governorships did not exist under most original state constitutions
and were created for much the same reason.6 The result, as of now,
is the widespread diffusion of both truly democratic gubernatorial
elections and built-in successors.

3

Id.; Jonathan Masters & Goal Ratnam, The U.S. Presidential Nominating
Process, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/uspresidential-nominating-process (last updated Jan. 13, 2020, 7:00 AM) (describing national conventions as “media events to highlight the presidential and vice
presidential nominees”).
4
Methods of Election, NAT’L LIEUTENANT GOVERNORS ASS’N,
https://nlga.us/research/methods-of-election/ (last visited May 15, 2021).
5
See FLETCHER M. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH
ATLANTIC STATES, 1776–1860: A STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY 89–
91 (2008); T. Quinn Yeargain, New England State Senates: Case Studies for Revisiting the Indirect Election of Legislators, 19 U.N.H. L. REV. 335 (2021).
6
See generally T. Quinn Yeargain, Democratizing Gubernatorial Succession, 71 RUTGERS U. L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 2021) [hereinafter Yeargain,
Democratizing Gubernatorial Succession].
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Some exceptions to both remain. Relevantly for this Article,
seven states don’t have lieutenant governors.7 Two of those—
Tennessee and West Virginia—have a position that is nominally
titled “lieutenant governor,” but it’s actually the president of the
state senate, not an independently elected position.8 In these seven
states, three of them place the secretary of state first in the line of
gubernatorial succession and the other four name the state senate
president as the designated successor.9 In the states with lieutenant
governors, seventeen states elect them separately from governors in
general elections.10 These states are primarily located in the southern
and western regions of the United States, although Delaware, Rhode
Island, and Vermont are notable exceptions.11
The remaining twenty-six states elect governors and lieutenant
governors on some form of team ticket in the general election.12
Only in a discrete minority of these cases—just eight states—does
the formation of a joint gubernatorial ticket resemble the formation
of a modern presidential ticket.13 In ten other states, gubernatorial
candidates run in their party’s primary with a pre-selected running
mate.14 The third form of team-ticket formation occurs when
gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates run in
7

Methods of Election, supra note 4 (“In three states (Arizona, Oregon, and
Wyoming), the Secretary of State is first in line of succession to governor and the
official is elected separately . . . . Four states have senate presidents as gubernatorial successor (Maine, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and West Virginia) . . . .”).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See id.; Yeargain, Democratizing Gubernatorial Succession, supra note 6.
12
Methods of Election, supra note 4.
13
COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 3; COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-101(3) (2020); FLA.
CONST. art. IV, § 5; IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 3; IOWA CODE § 43.123 (2020); KY.
CONST. § 70; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.126 (LexisNexis 2021); MICH. CONST.
art. V, § 21; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 1; NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-619.01 (2021); N.J.
CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 8; S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-12
(2020); S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-5-21 (2020).
14
ILL. CONST. art. V, § 4; 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/7-10 (2021); IND. CONST.
art. V, § 4; IND. CODE ANN. § 3-8-1-9.5 (LexisNexis 2021); KAN. CONST. art. I,
§ 1; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4003 (2021); MD. CONST. art. II, § 1B; MINN. CONST.
art. V, § 1; MINN. STAT. § 204B.06 subdiv. 7 (2021); MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 2;
N.D. CONST. art. V, § 3; N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-26 (2019); OHIO CONST. art.
III, § 1a; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.04 (LexisNexis 2020); UTAH CONST. art.
VII, § 2; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-202(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2020).
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separate primaries, with the winners of each primary forming a
ticket for the general election.15 Eight states use this system of ticket
formation today.16 The operation of separate primaries effectively
results in “shotgun weddings” in which the two nominees, who may
have an antagonistic relationship with each other, are forced to
productively co-exist for the remainder of the campaign—and if
they’re lucky, for the next four years.17
The development of these three different types of team-ticket
formation aren’t the product of old, well-established state practices.
Instead, before the mid-twentieth century, no state elected its
governor and lieutenant governor on a joint ticket.18 Beginning with
New York in 1953, however, twenty-six states amended their
constitutions or rewrote their laws to provide for team-ticket
elections.19 Despite the sudden nature of these changes, and the
extent to which they significantly altered how gubernatorial
elections are conducted and how governors are succeeded, little
legal scholarship has focused on explaining them. The little
scholarship that has notes, as a background matter, that states began
adopting team-based elections in the mid-twentieth century.20 But
there has been no effort to analyze these changes as part of a discrete
trend in state constitutional law, to explain why these changes took
place when they did, or to explore what patterns have emerged in
15

See Sam Janesch, Former Lt. Govs. Cawley, Jubelirer, Singel: Change the
Way Lieutenant Governors Are Elected in Pennsylvania, LANCASTERONLINE
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://lancasteronline.com/news/politics/former-lt-govs-cawley-jubelirer-singel-change-the-way-lieutenant-governors-are-elected-in-pennsylvania/article_b9ab1740-c986-11e7-9619-13ec733a21c5.html.
16
ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 8; CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 3; CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 9-181 (2020); HAW. CONST. art. V, § 2; MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXVI;
N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1; N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-104 (Consol. 2020); PA. CONST. art. IV, § 4; WIS. CONST. art. V, § 3; WIS. STAT. § 8.16(6)
(2020).
17
See, e.g., Janesch, supra note 15.
18
Single Ballot Amendment Up to Voters, ITHACA J., Oct. 31, 1945, at 16
(“This [amendment] will if adopted make New York the first state in the union to
conform to the existing method of electing our president and vicepresident by a
single vote.”).
19
Infra Part I.A.
20
See, e.g., Travis Lynch, Comment, The Problem with the Lieutenant Governor: A Legislative or Executive Position Under the Separation of Powers
Clause, 84 MISS. L.J. 87, 97 (2015).
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the development of specific types of team-ticket elections. The
adoption of team tickets, along with the development of the three
different methods of forming them, represent significant, and as yet
underdiscussed, changes in state constitutional law. This Article
explores these changes in detail and ultimately argues that teamticket gubernatorial elections should be both widely adopted and
reformed to ensure that the will of the electorate is reflected in the
winning ticket’s composition.
The first three Parts of this Article analyze the legal history of
how team tickets have been adopted. Part I focuses on the adoption
of team tickets in the first place, beginning with New York in 1953.
It explores how state constitutional amendments (and similar
changes in newly drafted state constitutions) providing for teamticket gubernatorial elections proliferated throughout the country in
such a short period of time. Additionally, it seeks to explain why
these changes took place when they did. Then, Part II provides a
practical follow-up to Part I by exploring the legislative history of
how these constitutional amendments were drafted and what
arguments were advanced in support of them.
Part III continues by focusing on the implementation of team
tickets in practice after the passage of state constitutional
amendments. It explains how the three different methods of teamticket formation were adopted and what arguments were made by
proponents and opponents of each. It concludes by arguing that,
following the adoption of team tickets as a general matter, a noticeable trend in state constitutional law has developed that disfavors
separate primaries and favors the formation of team tickets after primary elections.
Finally, Part IV argues that the foregoing historical discussion
makes clear that team-ticket elections, along with how those team
tickets were created, reflects a careful balance of maximizing voter
intent and ensuring the smooth operation of government. With that
balance in mind, it seeks to determine which type of team-ticket formation is ideal. In so doing, it explores the advantages and disadvantages of each type of team-ticket formation. Ultimately, it concludes that, while there are compelling reasons for pre- and postprimary team-ticket formation, separate primaries ought to be abolished altogether.

2021]

ONE VOTE, TWO WINNERS

757

I.
THE HISTORY OF TEAM-TICKET ADOPTION
In 1953, despite nearly 150 years of electing presidents and vice
presidents on a team-based ticket, no state provided the same system
for electing its governor and lieutenant governors.21 But by the end
of the year, New York voters had amended their constitution to do
just that.22 Within the next twenty years, seventeen more states
would join it; since then, ten more have joined.23 This flurry of state
constitutional activity has been, at most, mentioned in passing in academic literature. This Part sets out to explore it in greater detail,
focusing on how these changes have taken place and why they were
made—and why then. Part I.A. begins by telling the chronological
history of how team-ticket constitutional provisions were enacted,
along with the enabling legislation passed by state legislatures afterwards. Part I.B. then focuses on a broader thematic question: Why
were team-ticket gubernatorial elections adopted when they were?
In seeking to answer this question, it walks through several different
historical trends in federal and state elections and ultimately concludes that the confluence of those trends provides the likeliest explanation.
A.
Chronological History
In 1944, New York Governor Thomas Dewey proposed amending the state constitution to provide for the election of the governor
and lieutenant governor on a team ticket.24 The 1944 legislature approved the amendment,25 as did the 1945 legislature, and the change
was presented to the voters in a 1945 ballot measure.26 In the face of
near-unanimous opposition from the state Democratic Party, along
with most newspaper editorials, the proposal failed by about 10,000

21

See Single Ballot Amendment up to Voters, supra note 18.
N.Y. CTS., VOTES CAST FOR AND AGAINST PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS AND ALSO PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 36,
https://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/documents/Publications_Votes-Cast-Conventions-Amendments.pdf (last visited May 15, 2021).
23
See infra Part I.A.
24
Legislature Approves Bill for Joint Election of 2 Top Executives,
BINGHAMTON PRESS, Jan. 25, 1944, at 10.
25
Id.
26
Single Ballot Amendment up to Voters, supra note 18.
22
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votes.27 Nearly ten years later, Dewey and the legislature tried again,
and the amendment was approved by a fairly wide margin.28 The
success of the 1953 constitutional amendment kicked off a boomlet
of similar constitutional changes in other states.29
At the Alaska Constitutional Convention in 1955, the delegates
proposed an electoral system with a jointly elected governor and
secretary of state—functionally, just a lieutenant governor with
more official responsibilities, as the delegates explained30—which
was explicitly based on the 1953 amendment to the New York constitution.31 The convention ultimately adopted the proposal, along
27

N.Y. SEC’Y OF STATE, MANUAL FOR USE OF THE LEG. OF THE STATE OF
N.Y. 340 (1946) (noting that amendment received 475,912 votes in favor and
485,534 votes in opposition). While the 1945 effort was ultimately unsuccessful,
it may have inspired a similar push at the 1947 New Jersey Constitutional Convention. At the 1947 convention, there was some limited debate over creating a
lieutenant governor and providing for team-ticket elections. See 5 STATE OF NEW
JERSEY: CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947, at 445–46 (1951) (statement of
the Consumers’ League of New Jersey in favor of a lieutenant governor “elected
by the voters of the entire State and on the same ticket as the Governor” because
“[e]ven though he might, at times, be of a different faction than the Governor, he
would represent the same party organization to which the people have entrusted
the law enforcement and appointive powers.”).
28
N.Y. SEC’Y OF STATE, MANUAL FOR THE USE OF THE LEG. OF THE STATE
OF N.Y. 1284 (1954) (noting that amendment received 844,310 votes in favor and
663,571 votes in opposition).
29
The success of team-ticket elections demonstrated that, if you can make it
in New York, you’ll make it anywhere. See generally FRANK SINATRA, Theme
from New York, New York, on TRILOGY: PAST PRESENT FUTURE (Reprise Records
1980).
30
ALASKA CONST. CONVENTION, 1 PROCEEDINGS: NOVEMBER 8–DECEMBER
12, 1955, at 1985, akleg.gov/pdf/billfiles/ConstitutionalConvention/Proceedings/Proceedings%20-%20Complete.pdf (last visited May 15, 2021) (“The term
‘secretary of state’ to many of the Committee members was deemed to be a
broader description with less restrictive connotations than the term ‘lieutenant
governor’.”).
31
Id. The Committee proposing the new system
believe[d] that only persons who hold an elective office should
succeed to the Office of Governor. However, the successor
should be of the same political party as the governor to avoid
unnecessary confusion or waste when a vacancy occurs. These
considerations led the committee to adopt a plan of election
similar to that in effect in New York and also the same in
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with a separate provision requiring that the governor and lieutenant
governor run in separate primaries;32 the entire constitution was approved by the electorate shortly thereafter,33 and in 1970, the “secretary of state” was renamed the “lieutenant governor.”34
During the 1960s, nine additional states also adopted team-ticket
gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial elections: Colorado
(1968); Connecticut (1962); Florida (1968); Hawaii (1964), Massachusetts (1966); Michigan (1963); New Mexico (1962); Pennsylvania (1967); and Wisconsin (1967).35 Additionally, under the 1968
Guam and Virgin Islands Elective Governor Acts, which enabled
both territories to democratically elect their governors for the first
time, team-ticket elections were created.36 The change continued in
earnest in the early 1970s with Illinois (1970); Indiana (1974); Kansas (1972); Maryland (1970); Minnesota (1972); Montana (1972);
Nebraska (1970); North Dakota (1974); and South Dakota (1972)
following suit.37 From here, the changes slowed considerably, with
principle as the arrangement for election of President and Vicepresident of the United States.
ALASKA CONST. CONVENTION, COMMENTARY ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
ARTICLE, COMMITTEE PROPOSAL 10/a, at 2–3 (Dec. 16, 1955),
http://www.akleg.gov/pdf/billfiles/ConstitutionalConvention/Folder%20208.pdf.
32
See GERALD A. MCBEATH, THE ALASKA STATE CONSTITUTION 103–04
(2011).
33
ALASKA CONST. CONVENTION, FEBRUARY 5, 1956: SEVENTY-FIFTH DAY
3938, http://www.akleg.gov/pdf/billfiles/ConstitutionalConvention/Proceedings/
Proceedings%20-%20Day%2075%20-%20February%2005%201956%20-%20
Pages%203937-3961.pdf.
34
MCBEATH, supra note 32, at 103.
35
MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXVI (amended 1966); MICH. CONST. art.
V, § 21 (1963); PA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (1967); S. Con. Res. 2, 46th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess., 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 1083, 1083–84; H.J. Res. 1-2X, 41st Leg.,
Extraordinary Sess., 1967–68 Fla. Laws 536; Assemb. B. 855, 1st Reg. Sess.,
1967 Wis. Laws 666; S.J. Res. 3, 25th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1961 N.M. Laws 859;
H.B. 19, 2nd Leg., Reg. Sess., 1964 Haw. Laws 119; H.B. 4501, S. 1st Reg. Sess.,
1961 Conn. Laws 930.
36
Guam Elective Governor Act, Pub. L. No. 90-497, 82 Stat. 842, 842–43
(1968) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1422); Virgin Islands Elective Governor Act, Pub. L. 90-496, 82 Stat. 837, 837 (1968) (codified as amended at 48
U.S.C. § 1591).
37
ILL. CONST. art. V, § 4 (1970); MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1972); H.J. Res.
4, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., 1973 Ind. Laws 2004; S. Con. Res. 4031,
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only seven additional jurisdictions amending their constitutions to a
similar effect: American Samoa (1977); Iowa (1988); Kentucky
(1992); New Jersey (2005); the Northern Mariana Islands (1975);
Ohio (1976); South Carolina (2012); and Utah (1980).38
In most cases, the adoption of team-ticket gubernatorial elections occurred as part of discrete constitutional amendments—but in
Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, and Pennsylvania, the states
adopted team-ticket elections as part of broader constitutional rewrites.39 Similarly, in Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey,
North Dakota, and Utah, team tickets were adopted as part of targeted rewrites of the state executive branch.40 That leaves fourteen
states where the changes were presented to voters by themselves—
or with minor provisions tacked on.
Thinking only about the discrete constitutional amendments presented to voters (as opposed to the massive constitutional rewrites),
team tickets were usually approved by wide margins, proving that
they were largely uncontroversial to voters. The average executivebranch revision amendment was approved by 59.8% of the vote41
43rd Leg. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., 1973 N.D. Laws 1420; S. Con. Res. 46, 67th
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1972 Kan. Laws 1433; H.J. Res. 513, 47th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess., 1972 S.D. Laws 15; H.B. 3, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1970 Md. Laws
1298; Legis. B. 1160, 80th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1969 Neb. Laws 1428.
38
N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4 (amended 2005); H.R. 204, 119th Gen.
Ass., 2nd Reg. Sess., 2012 S.C. Laws 2969; S.B. 226, Reg. Sess., 1992 Ky. Laws
437; S.J. Res. 1, 72nd Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., 1988 Iowa Laws 730; S.J. Res.
7, 43rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1979 Utah Laws 1318; Amend. S.J. Res. 4, 111th
Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., 1976 Ohio Laws 3957; Howard P. Willens & Deanne
C. Siemer, The Constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands: Constitutional
Principles and Innovation in a Pacific Setting, 65 GEO. L.J. 1373, 1428 n.227
(1977); see also Ian Falefuafua Tapu, Comment, Who Really Is a Noble?: The
Constitutionality of American Samoa’s Matai System, 24 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM.
L.J. 61, 89 (2020) (describing adoption of American Samoa’s elected governor
and lieutenant governor).
39
See H.J. Res. 1-2X, 41st Leg., Extraordinary Sess., 1967–68 Fla. Laws 536.
See generally ILL. CONST. art. V, § 4 (1970); MICH. CONST. art. V, § 21 (1963);
MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1972); PA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (1967).
40
See N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4 (amended 2005); S.B. 226, Reg. Sess.,
1992 Ky. Laws 437, ch. 168; S.J. Res. 7, 43rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1979 Utah
Laws 1318; S. Con. Res. 4031, 43rd Leg. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., 1973 N.D. Laws
1420; S. Con. Res. 46, 67th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1972 Kan. Laws 1433; H.B. 3,
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1970 Md. Laws 1298.
41
Infra Appendix.
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and the average team-ticket amendment was approved by 63.97% of
the vote.42 With the exception of Kentucky, the voters of which approved the 1992 executive branch rewrite with just 51% of the
vote,43 all these amendments won at least 55% of the vote.44
B.
Team Tickets: Why Then?
Team tickets were adopted to mirror the federal model, in which
presidents and vice presidents are elected on the same ticket.45 This
much is obvious from the explicit remarks of state legislators proposing the changes, newspaper editorials endorsing the changes, and
voters in casting ballots for the changes.46 But team tickets in presidential elections were adopted, roughly speaking, in 180447—so
why did it take nearly 150 years for states to follow suit? There’s no
easy answer to this question. To slightly preview this Part’s ultimate
conclusion, the likeliest answer is that the belated implementation
of team tickets at the state level reflects the glacial speed with which
lieutenant governorships were created, the adoption of the so-called
“presidential short ballot,” and a relatively recent change in the
method of vice-presidential election.
To start off, the modern history of team tickets in presidential
elections begins with the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in
1804.48 Prior to the Twelfth Amendment’s ratification, electors cast
their ballots in a somewhat helter-skelter way. They’d cast two votes
each, with the first-place winner becoming president and the secondplace winner becoming vice president.49 The election of 1796
(which resulted in victory for President John Adams and Vice President Thomas Jefferson, who were rivals) and the election of 1800
(which resulted in presidential candidate Jefferson and vice42

Id.
Id.
44
See supra notes 41–43.
45
Infra Part III.C.
46
Id.
47
See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (ratified 1804).
48
Id.
49
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (1789) (“The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole
Number of Electors appointed; . . . . In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the
Vice President.”).
43
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presidential candidate Aaron Burr tying in electoral votes) unfolded
with such chaos that a movement developed to amend the constitution.50
The solution to this chaos was the Twelfth Amendment. Although the Amendment is widely recognized as the beginning of
modern presidential elections—by which most people mean the
team-based election of president and vice president51—that result
isn’t specifically demanded by the text. The Twelfth Amendment
merely requires that electors distinguish “the person voted for as
President” and “the person voted for as Vice-President . . . .”52 This
reflected a method of gubernatorial (and lieutenant-gubernatorial)
election that was common at the state level, with state constitutions
spelling out that, in casting votes for governor and lieutenant governor, voters were required to distinguish for whom they were voting
for each position. That was the system used in Massachusetts, for
example.53 And State Senator Barnabas Bidwell, who argued for the
Twelfth Amendment’s ratification, noted that, by requiring that the
electors distinguish their votes, the Amendment “will render the
Constitution of the United States, in this particular, analogous to our
own State Constitution.”54
Although the Twelfth Amendment may have been logically followed by joint elections, it didn’t explicitly require them—it instead
required separate elections for president and vice president, with
electoral college electors distinguishing among the two.55 Accordingly, even though the Amendment was followed by the establishment of team-based elections, this operated as a function of state
regulations of presidential elections, not as any sort of constitutional
or statutory requirement at the federal level.56 In this light, it perhaps
50

Jerry H. Goldfeder, Election Law and the Presidency: An Introduction and
Overview, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 974–76 (2016).
51
E.g., Nathan L. Colvin & Edward B. Foley, The Twelfth Amendment: A
Constitutional Ticking Time Bomb, 64 U. MIA. L. REV. 475, 491–94 (2010).
52
U.S. CONST. amend. XII (ratified 1804).
53
MASS. CONST. ch. II., § I–II.
54
Massachusetts Legislature, PITTSFIELD SUN, Mar. 5, 1804, at 2 (remarks
of State Senator Barnabas Bidwell).
55
See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (ratified 1804).
56
See Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV.
913, 922–26 (1992); see also Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional
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makes sense that the Twelfth Amendment was not followed by joint
elections at the state level.
It is also helpful to note here that the method in which presidential elections were originally conducted bears little resemblance to
presidential elections today. Today, even though presidential candidates’ names are on the ballot, it’s understood as a technical matter
that votes are actually being cast for a slate of electors affiliated with
the state-level branch of each nominee’s party and that those electors
actually vote for president.57 This was originally much more explicit. In the early days of post-Twelfth Amendment presidential
elections, voters cast ballots for individual electors.58 Beginning in
the late nineteenth century, some states began grouping these electors by party and then by adding the names of the presidential candidates.59 By the mid-twentieth century, most states had replaced the
names of the individual electors with those of the presidential and
vice-presidential nominees.60
Simultaneously, the process by which vice-presidential nominees were selected underwent similarly significant changes. Prior to
the mid-twentieth century, vice-presidential nominees were selected

Power over Presidential Elections: Lessons from the Past and Reforms for the
Future, 43 WM & MARY L. REV. 851, 854–60 (2002).
57
See, e.g., The Electoral College, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS. (Nov. 11,
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/the-electoral-college.aspx.
58
E.g., Spencer D. Albright, The Presidential Short Ballot, 34 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 955, 955 (1940).
59
See Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism,
Majoritarianism, and the Perils of Subconstitutional Change, 100 GEO. L.J. 173,
181 (2011) (describing states’ movements away from a system of selecting individual electors towards a “true winner-take-all” system involving “short ballot[s],
which removed the electors’ names from the ballot and listed only the presidential
and vice presidential tickets.”).
60
See Albright, supra note 58, at 958; see also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,
228–30 (1952); Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 195, 209 (2004); Howard M. Wasserman, Structural Principles and Presidential Succession, 90 KY. L.J. 345, 396 (2001–02); Amar &
Amar, supra note 56, at 925–26; Williams, supra note 59, at 181. The continued
presence of this method of elector selection in Alabama makes it near-impossible
to determine how many votes John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon actually received in the 1960 presidential election. See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, ROBERT
KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES 220 (2012).
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in the stereotypical “smoke-filled rooms” by party insiders.61 Their
nominations usually reflected compromises that gave a defeated faction of the party a nominal presence on the national ticket—not competence or worthiness as a candidate or even the presidential nominee’s own preferences.62 But Franklin Roosevelt’s insistence on
Henry Wallace as his running mate in 1940 seems to have served as
the catalyst for long-term change in how vice presidents are selected;63 today, the party’s nominee effectively has their choice of
running mate without restriction and only needs to worry about the
party convention rejecting the choice in rare cases.64
Finally, most states didn’t originally have lieutenant governors.
In lieu of a lieutenant governor, most states devolved gubernatorial
power to their state senate president—or perhaps to a member of
their state executive council—in the event of a gubernatorial vacancy.65 During the nineteenth century, lieutenant governorships
were increasingly embraced by states and became the dominant
method of replacing governors.66 As states were admitted to the Union with their original constitutions with lieutenant governors—or
amended their constitutions to create the office—the aforementioned history of vice-presidential election perhaps likely made it
unintuitive to provide for a team-ticket method of gubernatorial and
lieutenant-gubernatorial election. Moreover, given the extent to
which state constitutional drafters looked to other state constitutions
in developing their systems of government,67 perhaps an even

61

See JOEL KRAMER GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE
PRESIDENCY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 47–49 (1982);
Vice President, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF UNITED STATES POLITICAL PARTIES
337, 338 (3d ed. Harold F. Bass, Jr. ed., 2020); Vice President, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 777, 777 (David Schultz ed., 2009).
62
See SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY:
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1776–2014, at 205–06 (2015).
63
See RICHARD MOE, ROOSEVELT’S SECOND ACT: THE ELECTION OF 1940
AND THE POLITICS OF WAR 246 (2013).
64
See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller & Michael Cooper, Conservative Ire Pushed
McCain from Lieberman, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/us/politics/31reconstruct.html.
65
See Yeargain, Democratizing Gubernatorial Succession, supra note 6.
66
See generally id. (discussing adoption of lieutenant governorships).
67
See, e.g., G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 44–53
(1998) (discussing the extent to which state constitutions borrow from each other).
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likelier explanation is that, because no state had a team-ticket-based
election system, there was simply no model for the idea.
The culmination of these different historical trends likely created
a national environment in which team-ticket creation organically developed in the mid-twentieth century. For the first time in American
history, presidential nominees affirmatively chose their running mates, and they then appeared on the ballot together.68
This explanation is certainly more plausible than the facial explanation given by New York Governor Thomas Dewey in 1945 and
1953 when he advocated—first unsuccessfully, but later successfully—for the adoption of team tickets. His initial explanation, as
reported in 1944 and 1945, focused on a lieutenant-gubernatorial
vacancy that had occurred a few years earlier.69 When Lieutenant
Governor Thomas Wallace died in office in 1943, there was no obvious way to replace him.70 Litigation to force a special election ensued, and the New York Court of Appeals ultimately ordered that a
special election be held.71 At the resulting special election, State
Senate President Joe Hanley, who had been acting as lieutenant governor since Wallace’s death, was elected.72 Dewey argued that governors and lieutenant governors should be elected on a team ticket
because of the 1943 lieutenant-gubernatorial vacancy.73
At first blush, this logic makes little intuitive sense. There’s no
direct connection between a lieutenant-gubernatorial vacancy and
team tickets for gubernatorial elections. Dewey’s logic may have
drawn from the practical consequences of team tickets. If governors
and lieutenant governors are elected together, there is no possible
way a special election could be held to fill a lieutenant-gubernatorial
vacancy—one part of a team ticket. Who would vote in such an
68

See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, at 48–49 (describing how, “[a]s the power
of the Chief Executive has grown and that of the parties declined, the presidential
nominee has come to play the decisive role in the choice of his running mate.”).
69
Legislature Approves Bill for Joint Election of 2 Top Executives, supra
note 24.
70
See Issues Are Raised by Wallace Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1943, at 30.
71
See Ward v. Curran, 44 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241–42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943), aff’d
mem., 50 N.E.2d 1023 (N.Y. 1943).
72
Hanley Elected Lieutenant Governor; Republican Landslide Wins City,
County, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Nov. 3, 1943, at 1.
73
Legislature Approves Bill for Joint Election of 2 Top Executives, supra
note 24.
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election? If a Republican ticket had won the last gubernatorial (and
thus the lieutenant-gubernatorial) election, would just Republicans
vote? Would it be a race among only Republican candidates?74 If
not, and if other candidates could also run, what sense would it make
to potentially stick a governor with a lieutenant governor of another
party—especially when the adoption of team tickets was done to
avoid that exact outcome? Dewey’s implicit argument, therefore,
was likely that electing a team ticket would avoid a special lieutenant-gubernatorial election in the future and make the executive
branch run more efficiently in the process. (Electing governors and
lieutenant governors on the same ticket may also have lent democratic legitimacy to the idea of using a gubernatorial appointment to
fill a lieutenant-gubernatorial vacancy, but Dewey did not push for
such a proposal.)
But there’s another, more cynical explanation. The widespread
opposition of Democrats to the 1945 constitutional amendment
seemed to focus on the disproportionate impact it could have on their
statewide candidates.75 At the 1942 election, where Wallace was
elected, the American Labor Party ran a candidate for governor but
cross-endorsed the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor.76
The American Labor gubernatorial candidate seemed to pull votes
primarily from the Democratic Party, and as a result, the Democratic–American Labor lieutenant gubernatorial nominee performed
significantly better, nearly winning the election.77 Democrats alleged that Dewey’s proposed change intended to kneecap Democratic candidates in future elections by preventing cross74

These questions were raised in Florida in 2003, when Lieutenant Governor
Frank Brogan resigned, Governor Jeb Bush appointed Toni Jennings to succeed
him, and state Democrats initially argued that the lieutenant-gubernatorial vacancy needed to be filled by a special election. Brian E. Crowley, Possible Brogan
Successor May Face Vote to Keep Job, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 1A,
26A. Following Jennings’ appointment, however, the legislature passed legislation laying out a procedure for filling lieutenant-gubernatorial vacancies, Act of
June 20, 2003, H.B. 1051, ch. 2003-171, 2003 Fla. Laws 1123, and Democrats
dropped their legal objections to how the vacancy was filled. Bob Mahlburg, Jennings a Disappointment to Democratic Party Leaders, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July
24, 2003, at B5.
75
See Democrats Oppose Single Ballot, ITHACA J., Nov. 2, 1945, at 8.
76
Id.
77
See id.
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endorsements—and perhaps by encouraging third parties to nominate their own separate candidates.78 At a time when the major third
party in New York state politics, the American Labor Party, primarily pulled votes from Democratic candidates,79 Dewey’s partisan
motivation might be a persuasive counter-explanation.
Regardless of the explanation, however, New York’s successful
move to team-ticket gubernatorial elections in 1953 was clearly a
catalyst for subsequent states to do the same over the next several
decades.80 And the reasons cited by legislative leaders in advocating
for the adoption of team-ticket elections were persuasive to the voters of each state, given that the constitutional amendments enacting
them were ratified by fairly wide majorities.81 But the adoption of
team tickets only answers half of the question—after doing so, states
materially varied in how they implemented team-ticket elections.82
THE DEBATE OVER TEAM TICKETS
II.
In 1945, as the previous Part explains, New York voters narrowly rejected the proposed constitutional amendment to adopt
team-ticket gubernatorial elections. Part I explored how the eventual
adoption of team-ticket elections in 1953 resulted in a wave of similar constitutional changes in other states, as well as why team-ticket
proposals were introduced at the point in American history when
they were. This Part focuses on a more descriptive query: When
states were considering these constitutional amendments, what arguments did proponents and detractors make about them?
Part II.A. begins by reviewing the arguments made in New
York, both in 1945 and 1953. The arguments raised during both
elections are reflective of the arguments that would be raised in the
decades that followed as other states considered similar
78
See id. (“Parties would be discouraged from supporting a good candidate
of another party for governor or lieutenant governor unless they could also agree
on his running-mate.”).
79
See generally Alan Wolfe, The Withering Away of the American Labor
Party, 31 RUTGERS U. LIB. J. 46, 48–49 (1968) (discussing candidates from American Labor Party winning votes in “solidly Democratic” districts).
80
See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. CONVENTION, COMMENTARY ON THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH ARTICLE, supra note 31.
81
Supra Part I.A.
82
See id.
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amendments. Part II.B. then reviews the arguments made in other
states. These debates played out with similar arguments as those
made in New York but, in many cases, focused on state-specific
contexts and histories that were absent in New York.
A.

The Debate Over New York’s 1945 and 1953 Amendments
To briefly recap, in advocating for the proposed 1945 amendment, Governor Dewey explicitly tied the idea of team tickets to
avoiding burdensome special elections to fill lieutenant-gubernatorial vacancies.83 This argument, however, was not the primary one
made by state Republicans, who were the amendment’s chief advocates84—and it doesn’t appear to have been made at all in 1953. Instead, in 1945, Republicans argued that the governor and lieutenant
governor should be of the same party.85 The biggest advantage of
guaranteeing same-party alignment was that, in the event of a gubernatorial vacancy, executive power would not devolve to a member of the opposite party.86 In making this argument, Republicans
could not point to a specific example in which this had happened.
The last time that a governor and lieutenant governor of different
parties had been elected was 1924, when Democrat Alfred Smith
was re-elected as governor and Republican Seymour Lowman narrowly defeated Smith’s lieutenant governor for re-election.87 After
the 1953 amendment was approved, it was noted in passing that,
during the Smith–Lowman administration, Smith “stayed pretty
close to the state” and avoided leaving to prevent Lowman from exercising power.88 Had Lowman been able to do so, the Republican
83

Supra Part I.B.
See GOP Leader Favors Single Ballot, ITHACA J., Nov. 1, 1945, at 15.
85
Id.; see Legislature Approves Bill for Joint Election of 2 Top Executives,
supra note 24.
86
Single Ballot Amendment up to Voters, supra note 18.
87
Donald O. Cunnion, Legislature Adopts Dewey Plan to Elect Governor,
Lieutenant of Same Party, GLENS FALLS POST-STAR, Jan. 26, 1944, at 1; see Howard A. Shiebler, Coolidge Popular Vote May Exceed Harding’s; Split Power in
Albany, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Nov. 6, 1924, at 1–2 (noting that Lieutenant
Governor George Lunn lost re-election to Seymour Lowman).
88
BI-PARTISAN, Pay Raises Will Lure Candidates, PRESS & SUN-BULL.
(Binghamton, N.Y.), Dec. 20, 1953, at 9–A (“The late Alfred E. Smith served as
governor one term with a lieutenant-governor of the opposite political party. As a
result, Smith stayed pretty close to the state.”).
84
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Party would have enjoyed, however briefly, total control over the
state government. Some of the advocates noted in passing that teamticket gubernatorial elections would be in line with how presidential
elections were conducted, but this didn’t seem to be a major focus
of the campaign.89
Opponents of the amendment—who were mainly, but not exclusively, Democrats—primarily emphasized the value of voter choice.
Their arguments emphasized the importance of the electorate’s right
to vote for lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates of their choosing, a
choice that was ostensibly made independently of their choice in the
gubernatorial election.90 Perhaps drawing inspiration from the historical method by which vice presidents were elected, they argued
that “the lieutenant governor could be a choice of the [gubernatorial
nominee] rather than of the voters.”91 Building on this argument,
they suggested that the team-ticket method of election would allow
party bosses to make a “purely political choice for lieutenant governor”92 and that “some party hack or out-and-out crook”93 or “‘some
rich dope, by paying enormous party contributions,’ could get on the
ticket as lieutenant governor.”94 And if an incompetent or unqualified choice were made, voters “could not discriminate” among the
lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates and, in voting for governor,
would be forced to accept a disfavored lieutenant-gubernatorial
nominee.95 An unqualified nomination would have been less likely
under the then-existing system—which they argued “has worked
89
See Cunnion, supra note 87 (noting that Republican State Assembly Majority Leader Irwin M. Ives, “emphasized that the President and Vice President of
the United States are elected jointly.”).
90
See id.
91
Up for Decision on Tuesday, PRESS & SUN-BULL. (Binghamton, N.Y.),
Nov. 3, 1945, at 6.
92
GOP Leader Favors Single Ballot, supra note 84.
93
Yes—Yes—No—Yes—Yes—Yes—Yes—Yes—No, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct.
26, 1953, at 29.
94
GOP Leader Favors Single Ballot, supra note 84; see also Single Ballot
Amendment up to Voters, supra note 18 (“The opponents contend the joining ballot for these two offices would deprive the people of any choice in their selection
of a lieutenant governor and that a merely rich or unfit candidate for lieutenant
governor, or vice versa, could be elected on the strength of his co-partner’s ability
or popularity.”).
95
Cunnion, supra note 87; Vote ‘No’ on Amendment No. 3, ONEONTA STAR,
Oct. 23, 1953, at 4.

770

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:751

well and should be continued”96—because “political parties are under a strong obligation to nominate persons of character and ability
for the office of lieutenant-governor since the voters have the power
to cross party lines in making their choice.”97
B.
Debates in Other States
The arguments made in 1945 and 1953 accurately foreshadowed
the arguments that would be made in the decades that followed. Advocates of team-ticket amendments emphasized the importance of
ensuring that the governor and lieutenant governor were of the same
political party.98 In many states, however, these arguments focused
on specific examples from state history when governors and

96
97

Single Ballot Amendment up to Voters, supra note 18.
E.g., First Four Amendments, KINGSTON DAILY FREEMAN, Oct. 19, 1953,

at 4.
98
See, e.g., LEGIS. COUNCIL COLO. GEN. ASSEMB., LEGISLATIVE
PROCEDURES IN COLORADO, Research Publ’n No. 119, at 36 (Dec. 1966) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES IN COLORADO]; Amendments Facing Minnesotans on Nov. 7 Ballot, ST. CLOUD DAILY TIMES, Nov. 2, 1972, at 19; Willard
Baird, The Proposed Constitution, HOLLAND EVENING SENTINEL, Feb. 19, 1963,
at 6; Dick Cowen, Key Feature of Question 4-A: Allowing Governor Second
Term, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, May 8, 1967, at 29; Al Cross, Two Teams:
More Players and Issues, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 5, 1992, at 1, 9; John
Elmer, 1970 Constitution Proposes Added Powers for Governor, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
17, 1970, at 2; Five Amendments to Be on Ballot, BRIDGEPORT POST, Mar. 8, 1962,
at 12; Governor and Lieutenant Governor Would Run for Election as a Team,
PALLADIUM-ITEM (Richmond, Ind.), Oct. 23, 1974, at 4; Will Harrison, Nobody’s
Acceptable for State’s Dough on Ute Dam, ALAMOGORDO DAILY NEWS, June 27,
1962, at 4; Dick Herman, ‘Team Ballot’ for Governor, Lieutenant Governor
Urged, LINCOLN EVENING J. & NEB. STATE J., Aug. 24, 1970, at 8; Editorial, Issue
1—Yes, J. HERALD (Dayton, Ohio), May 26, 1976, at 4; Editorial, Proposition 1
Deserves ‘Yes’, HERALD (Provo, Utah), Nov. 2, 1980, at 44; Pros and Cons Recapped for Tomorrow’s Ballot, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Nov. 2, 1964, at 1–A;
Strange Bedfellows Indeed, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1972, at 7; Editorial,
Team Approach, Yes, CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 1988, at 8A; Editorial,
Vote ‘Yes’ on Question No. 1, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 21, 1966, at 14; Editorial, Vote
‘Yes’ on Question 5, JANESVILLE DAILY GAZETTE, Mar. 30, 1967, at 6; William
C. Wertz, Amendment ‘E’ Passage Would Affect State Terms, ARGUS-LEADER
(Sioux Falls, S.D.), Oct. 10, 1970, at 7; J.D. Wilson, Measure Would End Split
Ticket, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 18, 1974, at 3.
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lieutenant governors of different parties had served99—in some
cases, quite frequently.100 These arguments were particularly poignant in states that, at the time the amendments were proposed or voted
on, actually had such a party split in their executive branch101 or that
had experienced a party switch following a gubernatorial vacancy.102 But these arguments went beyond the mere claim that
99

Amendments Facing Minnesotans on Nov. 7 Ballot, supra note 98; Ray
Broussard, Three Proposed Amendments to Face Voters at General Election,
COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE-TELEGRAPH, Sept. 6, 1968, at 30; Cowen, supra note
98; Harrison, supra note 98; Strange Bedfellows Indeed, supra note 98; Three
Amendments, CALL-LEADER (Elwood, Ind.), Oct. 26, 1974, at 1, 9.
100
For example, in 1967 a Wisconsin newspaper pointed out the following:
There have been [ten] times in the state’s history where the voters have elected a governor of one party and a lieutenant governor of another party. This has happened three times in the last
four elections. On two occasions, the governor has died in office and the voters wound up with a governor of the party which
had been defeated in the last gubernatorial election.
Vote ‘Yes’ on Question 5, supra note 98; see also Steve Wilson, Tandem Issue:
Two Officials for Only One Vote, CIN. ENQUIRER, May 16, 1976, at B-2 (“Since
1856, there have been [ten] times when a governor served with a lieutenant governor of another political party—including the state’s present governor, James A.
Rhodes. Rhodes is a Republican and Celeste is a Democrat.”).
101
JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS, 1818–1970, at 157
(1972) (“This change was clearly a reaction to the situation at the time the delegates were meeting, when a Republican governor and a Democratic lieutenant
governor were in office.”); Proposition 1 Deserves ‘Yes’, supra note 98; Wilson,
supra note 100. In Colorado, for example, the 1956 election produced a narrow
Democratic victory in the gubernatorial election and an even narrower Republican
victory in the lieutenant-gubernatorial election. My great-grand uncle, State Senator Sam Taylor, was the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor. See
McNichols Let Him Down, Sam Taylor Complains, FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN,
Nov. 9, 1956, at 6. Several years later, Taylor proposed a constitutional amendment to provide for the joint election of both offices, but it was rejected by the
State Senate. See Civil Service Amendment Narrowly OKd by House, FORT
COLLINS COLORADOAN, Feb. 8, 1960, at 1. When the amendment adopted by Colorado voters in 1968 was approved by the state legislature, however, Taylor was
not one of the legislators responsible for its passage—although he did vote for it.
See S. JOURNAL, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., at S. CON. RES. 6 (Colo. 1967).
102
Jim Davis, Editorial, For Issue 1, Against Issue 2, DAILY REP. (Dover,
Ohio), May 22, 1976, at A-4 (“On three occasions, the lieutenant governor succeeding the governor was from a different party—the most recent being John
Brown, who replaced Frank Lausche for a brief time in 1957 when Lausche resigned to become U.S. senator.”); Vote ‘Yes’ on Question 5, supra note 98.
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avoiding these sorts of party splits was desirable; they also focused
on the tangible negative impacts that party splits had. Advocates
noted that when governors left the state, and lieutenant governors of
the opposite party acted as governor in their absence, they made decisions and appointments that were out-of-step with the elected governor’s position.103 They also argued that governors were more
likely to include their lieutenant governors in policymaking when
they were of the same party104—especially when they were elected
together—citing examples in which governors had altogether ignored their ostensible deputies.105 This, in turn, led to an argument
rooted in fiscal responsibility, specifically that a more involved lieutenant governor with actual responsibilities would allow taxpayers
to “get better value for the dollars spent on the lieutenant governor’s
position.”106 In some states, these changes were adopted in tandem
with other constitutional modifications that sought to reduce the
number of statewide elected officials107—a belated paean to the
103
E.g., Broussard, supra note 99 (“Those such as Love are disenchanted with
the present setup because they feel whenever they leave the state a lieutenant governor from the opposing party will run rampant making appointments and the
like.”); Keith Schonrock, Pairing of Offices Seen as Basic Need, HARTFORD
COURANT, Apr. 22, 1962, at 3B (“In some instances of political division between
the governor and the lieutenant governor, the governor has actually been afraid to
leave the state, especially when legislative sessions were going, lest his politically-inimical deputy upset some policy or patronage applecarts.”); Glenn Urban,
Executive Team from Same Party Is Decision of Voters Tuesday, COLO. SPRINGS
GAZETTE-TELEGRAPH, Oct. 31, 1968, at 10–D (noting that, during Governor
Love’s administration, Lieutenant Governor Hogan filled a county commission
vacancy with a Democrat to replace a Republican).
104
See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES IN COLORADO, supra note 98, at 36;
Governor and Lieutenant Governor Would Run for Election as a Team, supra
note 98; Pros and Cons Recapped for Tomorrow’s Ballot, supra note 98.
105
E.g., Davis, supra note 102 (“[Lieutenant Governor] Celeste, who is out
campaigning for the team effort, confesses he has hardly talked to Gov. Rhodes
since they both took office [seventeen] months ago. Before that, John Brown’s
contact with Gilligan was even less.”); Team Approach, Yes, supra note 98 (“Lt.
Gov. Jo Ann Zimmerman, a Democrat, can barely remember the last time she had
a talk with Republican Gov. Terry Branstad . . . . Branstad would make the lieutenant governor wait six weeks for an appointment.”).
106
Team Approach, Yes, supra note 98; see also Davis, supra note 102.
107
E.g., Referenda: Question No. One, FITCHBURG SENTINEL (Fitchburg,
Mass.), Oct. 19, 1966, at 6; James P. Warnick, Short Ballot Battle Has Been Long
Fight, DECATUR REV. (Decatur, Ill.), Mar. 23, 1970, at 8.
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“short ballot” movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.108 Finally, many supporters of these amendments argued
that their states should join the federal government, along with many
other states, in adopting team tickets.109
Opponents, meanwhile, largely relied on the voter-choice argument raised by New York Democrats in 1945 and 1953: if elections
were joined, voters were deprived of their ability to elect the most
qualified candidate.110 One Ohio state representative noted that
avoiding a party split in the state executive branch, one of the main
features proponents endorsed, might be contrary to what voters intended: “It is just possible that the voters did just exactly what they
wanted to do in electing a governor of one party and lieutenant governor of another party.”111 In support of this argument, some suggested that having a governor and lieutenant governor of different
parties was beneficial because it could provide a check on the governor’s power112—although, beyond “keeping the governors on the

108

See Tyler Yeargain, The Legal History of State Legislative Vacancies and
Temporary Appointments, 28 J.L. & POL’Y 564, 623–25 (2020) [hereinafter Yeargain, Legal History] (discussing “short ballot” movement).
109
E.g., MICH. CONST. CONVENTION, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 452 (1961); Broussard, supra note 99; Five Amendments to Be on
Ballot, supra note 98; Pros and Cons Recapped for Tomorrow’s Ballot, supra
note 98.
110
LEGIS. COUNCIL COLO. GEN. ASSEMB., AN ANALYSIS OF 1968 BALLOT
PROPOSALS, Rsch. Publ’n No. 133, at 2–3 (1968) [hereinafter 1968 COLORADO
BALLOT PROPOSALS ANALYSIS]; Constitutional Amendment OK’d for November
Ballot, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Mar. 10, 1964, at 17; Ex-State Officials Differ on
Amendment, MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., Oct. 27, 1972, at 7B; Maynard Leahey, Questions 1 and 2, NORTH ADAMS TRANSCRIPT (North Adams, Mass.), Nov. 2, 1966,
at 5; Three Amendments, supra note 99; Brian Usher, Ohio Voters to Decide on
Pairing Top Offices, AKRON BEACON J., Jan. 29, 1976, at B4; Voters Facing Eight
Constitutional Referenda, DAILY NORTHWESTERN (Oshkosh, Wis.), Mar. 17,
1967, at 4.
111
Usher, supra note 110; see also Joint Election Hottest Issue, COSHOCTON
TRIB., May 30, 1976, at 3 (“Opponents argue that Issue 1 would eliminate the
right of the voters to pick the lieutenant governor independently. They claim this
right has been notably exercised in the last two statewide elections when the voters
chose governors and lieutenant governors of opposite parties.”).
112
For example, an Indiana newspaper described opponents’ beliefs in the following way:

774

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:751

job and not running around outside the state” for fear of what the
lieutenant governor might do in their absence,113 it’s not quite clear
how lieutenant governors could exercise a meaningful check. Opponents of the amendments also argued that separate elections encouraged stronger candidates to run for lieutenant governor.114 Because
team-ticket elections allowed the gubernatorial nominees—or their
parties—to artificially form a ticket, opponents argued that lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees would be selected for their ability to balance the ticket, not their competence.115 And one state senator in
Iowa argued that the selection of running mates by gubernatorial
nominees would reduce the number of women nominated for the
office, noting that “[t]he majority of women lieutenant governors
have been people who have put themselves forward . . . .”116
Opponents of the amendment, believe that it might be healthy
to have a Governor and Lieutenant Governor of opposite political beliefs. That would provide an effective system of checks
and balances. The opponents also worry that the amendment
would concentrate too much power in the Governor’s hands and
reduce the Lieutenant Governor to a ‘rubber stamp’ supporter
of the Governor’s point of view.
Three Amendments, supra note 99.
113
Harrison, supra note 98. This argument falls under its own weight, however—if having a lieutenant governor of the opposite party serves as a meaningful
check on the governor by keeping her from leaving the state, that seems to suggest
that undesirable consequences would follow a gubernatorial vacancy.
114
See 1968 COLORADO BALLOT PROPOSALS ANALYSIS, supra note 110110,
at 2–3.
115
E.g., Editorial, Measures on the Nov. 5 Ballot, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 25,
1974, at 4; David Watson, Legislators Blister Lieutenant Governor Concept,
TAMPA TRIB., July 12, 1968, at 1, 12–A; see also Richard Pyle, One Post Nobody
Wants, But Most Would Accept, PORT HURON TIMES HERALD, Dec. 29, 1963, at
3.
116
Editorial, Streamline Officials, Too, IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN, Feb. 29,
1988, at 5A. As an empirical statement, this is false. Iowa had a female lieutenant
governor when the team-ticket amendment was approved, which initiated a threedecade streak of female lieutenant governors, which only ended when Lieutenant
Governor Kim Reynolds became Governor in 2017 upon the governor’s resignation. Eric Ostermeier, Number of Female Lieutenant Governors to Increase After
2016, SMART POL. (Aug. 7, 2016), https://editions.lib.umn.edu/smartpolitics/2016/08/07/number-of-female-lieutenant-governors-to-increase-after-2016/;
Jason Noble, Kim Reynolds Becomes Iowa’s First Female Governor, DES MOINES
REG. (May 24, 2017, 7:07 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/
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Several additional points are worth noting. First, because most
constitutional amendments providing for team-ticket gubernatorial
elections did not specify how the team tickets would be formed,117
the aforementioned arguments played out as a choose-your-own-adventure novel. Depending on the method of ticket formation, the arguments for or against the amendments would be mitigated entirely.
For example, if a state legislature’s enabling act provided for separate primaries, the notion that lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees
would be selected as mere ticket balancers, and that voters would
have no say in the selection, would be entirely untrue. On the other
hand, some of the arguments in favor of team tickets would be similarly undermined by separate primaries. If gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates were nominated in separate primaries, antagonistic candidates could emerge as their party’s respective
nominees, making collaboration significantly less likely.118 Second,
once a number of states had adopted team-ticket amendments, formal opposition seemed to fade.119 In many states, the Democratic
and Republican parties both endorsed—either expressly or tacitly—
the amendments120 and opposition was largely nonexistent.121 This

story/news/2017/05/24/kim-reynolds-takes-oath-office-becomes-iowas-first-female-governor/341857001/. Moreover, the best available political science research on the subject has shown that lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees are more
likely to be female, not less, if selected by gubernatorial nominees. See Valerie
M. Hennings & R. Urbatsch, Gender, Partisanship, and Candidate-Selection
Mechanisms, 16 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 290, 299–305 (2016).
117
Iowa is one of the only examples in which, because the state legislature
passed an enabling act before the constitutional amendment passed, voters knew
exactly what they were voting for. See Act of Apr. 27, 1988, ch. 1121, 1988 Iowa
Laws 166.
118
Daniel J. Foley, Judge Recommends Functions for Office, MISSOULIAN
(Missoula, Mont.), Feb. 2, 1972, at 8; see also Team Approach, Yes, supra note
98 (“In other words, the team approach doesn’t guarantee that the governor and
the lieutenant governor will be compatible in office.”).
119
See, e.g., Linda Lantor, Lieutenant Governor Amendments Big Winners,
DES MOINES REG., Nov. 9, 1988, at 8M; Elon Torrence, Kansas Would Elect Gubernatorial Team, GARDEN CITY TELEGRAM, Nov. 1, 1972, at 12.
120
E.g., Iowa Political Leaders Back Gubernatorial Team Proposal, SIOUX
CITY J., Sept. 30, 1988, at A8; Torrence, supra note 119; Vote ‘Yes’ on Question
No. 1, supra note 98.
121
See Lantor, supra note 119; Torrence, supra note 119.
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weakening of the opposition is in line with the generally high voter
support for team-ticket amendments.122
III.
THE POST-AMENDMENT FORMATION OF TEAM TICKETS
Once a state has embraced team-ticket elections for its governors
and lieutenant governors, what happens next? In most cases, because the constitutional amendments adopted did not typically address how team-ticket elections would be conducted, legislatures
were required to pass some form of enabling act. Part III picks up
where Part I left off and explores how states initially, and subsequently, structured their team-ticket elections. Part III.A. tells the
chronological history of how team-ticket enabling statutes were
adopted. Part III.B. then identifies, to the greatest extent possible,
the arguments made in favor of the various modes of team-ticket
formation. Part III.C. then reviews the state-level experiences with
each of the methods of team-ticket formation, responding where appropriate to the arguments raised in the previous parts. Finally, Part
III.D. concludes by extracting from this legislative history an as-yetunreported trend in state election law—the trend away from separate
primaries and toward post-primary selection.
A.

Enabling Acts, Subsequent Modifications, and Other Postamendment History
Following the electorate’s ratification of a constitutional amendment providing for team tickets, most legislatures were tasked with
operationalizing the amendments’ requirements into set procedures.
In a handful of cases, the ratification of new constitutions or constitutional amendments completed the process outright.123 Because the
newly adopted constitutional provisions set out a clear procedure for
nominating governors and lieutenant governors to create a joint
ticket, no statutory codification or enabling act was required. The
1963 Michigan Constitution and New Jersey’s Question 1 in 2005
both made clear, for example, that the governor would select the
lieutenant governor after the primary.124 The 1968 Florida
122

Supra Part II.A.
See infra text accompanying notes 124–26.
124
See MICH. CONST. art. V, § 21 (1963); N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4
(amended 2005).
123
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Constitution, Maryland’s Question 1 in 1970, and the 1972 Montana
Constitution provided that gubernatorial candidates would select
their running mates before the primary and would, thus, be jointly
nominated.125 In a similar regard, the ratification of South Dakota’s
Amendment 2 in 1972 required no enabling act because, under thenexisting state law, lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates were nominated at state party conventions, a practice that continued thereafter.126
And in Iowa and Kentucky, enabling acts were enacted before
the amendments were passed.127 Both state legislatures, after approving the constitutional amendments, also approved legislation
that was contingent on the amendments’ passage, as mentioned previously, which allowed the subsequent debate over the amendments’
efficacy to play out with tangible stakes.128 In Iowa, state legislators
approved legislation allowing gubernatorial nominees to select their
running mates after winning the primary.129 In Kentucky, gubernatorial candidates were required to run with lieutenant-gubernatorial
candidates in the same primary.130
But for every other state, the constitutional adoption of a teamticket requirement did little to practically implement the new system. Accordingly, state legislatures enacted legislation that set out
specific team-ticket formation procedures.131 Most states opted for
separate primaries for gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial

125
MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1972); H.J. Res. 1-2X, 41st Leg., Extraordinary
Sess., 1967–68 Fla. Laws 536; H.B. 3, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1970 Md. Laws
1298.
126
See Act of Mar. 15, 1965, ch. 86, 1965 S.D. Laws 197 (“After perfecting
its organization, the convention shall . . . nominate candidates for . . . Lieutenant
Governor . . . .”).
127
Act of Apr. 9, 1992, § 14, ch. 288, 1992 Ky. Laws 809, 818; Act of Apr.
27, 1988, ch. 1121, 1988 Iowa Laws 166.
128
See Act of Apr. 9, 1992, § 14, ch. 288, 1992 Ky. Laws 809, 818; Act of
Apr. 27, 1988, ch. 1121, 1988 Iowa Laws 166 (“This section applies only if the
constitutional amendment contained in Senate Joint Resolution 1* is adopted by
the qualified electors of this state in the general election in 1988.”).
129
Act of Apr. 27, 1988, ch. 1121, 1988 Iowa Laws 166.
130
Act of Apr. 9, 1992, § 14, ch. 288, 1992 Ky. Laws 809.
131
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 153, 1973 Kan. Laws 538; Act of May
18, 1973, ch. 318, 1973 Minn. Laws 630; Act of Mar. 10, 1978, ch. 115, 1978
Ohio Laws 233.
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candidates.132 Only Kansas, Minnesota, and Ohio differed.133 In
these states, gubernatorial candidates were required to run in partisan primaries with lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates, and the joint
winners of the primary would continue as the party’s nominees in
the general election.134
Following the adoption of these initial procedures, several states
amended them fairly significantly. Between 1981 and 2018, eight
states adopted different procedures a total of nine times.135 In 1981,
for example, Indiana changed from a system of separate primaries—
which had been used in the 1976 and 1980 gubernatorial elections—
to one in which the gubernatorial nominee selected their running
mate after the primary.136 The same year, North Dakota—which had
used separate primaries for the same gubernatorial elections as Indiana—adopted a new nominating system in which gubernatorial candidates ran with lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates pre-designated.137 In 1994, Utah similarly moved from a separate-primaries
selection system to a pre-primary selection system.138 And in 1997,
Indiana reverted from post-primary selection to pre-primary selection.139
Beginning in the late 1990s, however, a small trend has developed in favor of post-primary selection. Florida adopted a
132

See Methods of Election, supra note 4 (listing states that continue to use
separate primary systems).
133
Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 153, 1973 Kan. Laws 538; Act of May 18, 1973,
ch. 318, 1973 Minn. Laws 630; Act of Mar. 10, 1978, ch. 115, 1978 Ohio Laws
233.
134
Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 153, 1973 Kan. Laws 538; Act of May 18, 1973,
ch. 318, 1973 Minn. Laws 630; Act of Mar. 10, 1978, ch. 115, 1978 Ohio Laws
233.
135
Act of Apr. 21, 1981, Pub. L. No. 12, 1981 Ind. Laws 301; Act of Apr. 6,
1981, ch. 241, 1981 N.D. Laws 542; Act of Jan. 27, 1994, ch. 1, 1994 Utah Laws
61; Act of May 13, 1997, Pub. L. No. 3, 1997 Ind. Laws 651; Steve Liewer, Independents Hope to Level Playing Field, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale,
Fla.), Sept. 28, 1998, at 4B; Act of June 3, 2000, ch. 387, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws
2027; Leg. Res. 14CA, 96th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1999 Neb. Laws 156-57; Act of
Mar. 15, 2018, Act No. 142, 2018 S.C. Laws 1331; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 118.126 (2020).
136
Act of Apr. 21, 1981, Pub. L. No. 12, 1981 Ind. Laws 301.
137
Act of Apr. 6, 1981, ch. 241, 1981 N.D. Laws 542.
138
Act of Jan. 27, 1994, ch. 1, 1994 Utah Laws 61.
139
Act of May 13, 1997, Pub. L. No. 3, 1997 Ind. Laws 651.
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constitutional amendment in 1998 that, among many other electionlaw changes, dropped the requirement in the state’s 1968 constitution that gubernatorial candidates run with running mates in the primary.140 In 2000, Colorado and Nebraska each adopted similar
changes—Colorado statutorily and Nebraska by virtue of a constitutional amendment.141 The South Carolina Legislature also adopted
post-primary selection in its 2018 enabling act for the 2012 constitutional amendment that tied gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial elections.142 And finally, in 2020, the Kentucky Legislature
made the same change.143 The only exception in the past two decades to this mini-trend has been Illinois, which in 2010, ditched its
separate-primaries requirement in favor of a pre-primary selection
procedure.144
B.

State Experiences with Different Methods of Ticket
Formation
Despite the base similarity between states with team tickets, differences in team-ticket formation have resulted in significantly different outcomes. This Part reviews the state experiences with each
of the three different methods of ticket formation, focusing on the
patterns of lieutenant-gubernatorial selection and challenges that
have arisen.
First, states with post-primary lieutenant-gubernatorial selection
have seen selection practices that don’t significantly differ from the
selection procedure used by presidential candidates. Like presidential candidates,145 they aim for ticket-balancing characteristics, like
geography, gender, race, age, ideology, and a balance between political insiders and outsiders.146 (And, like presidential nominees,
140

See Liewer, supra note 135.
Act of June 3, 2000, ch. 387, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 2027; Leg. Res. 14CA,
96th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1999 Neb. Laws 156–57.
142
Act of Mar. 15, 2018, Act No. 142, 2018 S.C. Laws 1331.
143
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.126 (2020).
144
Act of July 12, 2010, Pub. Act 96-1018, 2010 Ill. Laws 3736.
145
Lee Sigelman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, The “Veepstakes”: Strategic Choice in
Presidential Running Mate Selection, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 855, 860 (1997).
146
See, e.g., Hennings & Urbatsch, supra note 116, at 305 (concluding that,
when lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates are selected by gubernatorial nominee,
women are more likely to be represented on the ticket); Michael D. Martinez,
141
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they frequently select former opponents for their party’s nomination.)147 In these states, after winning their party’s nomination, each
gubernatorial nominee selects a lieutenant-gubernatorial nominee.148 The time at which running mates are selected makes it possible, and likely advantageous, for the gubernatorial nominee to
choose a former opponent for the job. In some cases, depending on
state law, gubernatorial nominees might even be able to choose
members of the other party149—an option repeatedly considered, but
never used, at the national level.150
Second, in states where gubernatorial candidates make pre-primary running-mate selections, the selection criteria are much the
same. Candidates in these states have a slightly smaller universe
Gubernatorial Tickets in Primary Elections, 1983–1986, 21 STATE & LOCAL
GOV’T REV. 84, 86–87 (1989). These studies—and a handful of others—notwithstanding, little attention in political science has focused on the selection of lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates.
147
See, e.g., James Call, Andrew Gillum Picks Chris King as Running Mate
for Governor Matchup with DeSantis/Nunez, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Sept. 6,
2018, 7:39 PM), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2018/09/06/andrewgillum-picks-chris-king-lieutenant-governor-running-mate/1210356002/ (noting
that 2018 Florida Democratic gubernatorial nominee Andrew Gillum chose Chris
King, who lost 2018 Democratic primary, as his running mate).
148
See, e.g., Act of June 3, 2000, ch. 387, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 2027; Act
of Mar. 15, 2018, Act No. 142, 2018 S.C. Laws 1331.
149
E.g., Dana Ferguson, Billie Sutton Names Running Mate Right Before SD
Democratic Party Meet in Sioux Falls, ARGUS-LEADER (Sioux Falls, S.D.) (June
14, 2018, 6:09 PM), https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/politics/2018/
06/14/billie-sutton-announce-running-mate-thursday-sioux-falls/699600002/
(noting that Billie Sutton, Democratic nominee for Governor of South Dakota in
2018, chose Michelle Lavallee, a Republican, as his running mate); see T. Quinn
Yeargain, Getting the Dream Team on the Ballot: The Legality of Bipartisan Gubernatorial Tickets, 2021 MICH. STATE L. REV. (forthcoming October 2021). But
see Marc Caputo, ‘Millions of Dollars Committed’: Murphy Enters New Phase of
Bipartisan Bid with Jolly, POLITICO (May 17, 2018, 5:07 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2018/05/17/millions-of-dollars-committed-murphy-enters-new-phase-of-bipartisan-bid-with-jolly-424566 (noting that Florida
law is unclear on legality of a bipartisan gubernatorial ticket).
150
Matthew Rozsa, What if John McCain Had Picked Joe Lieberman in
2008?, SALON (Sept. 8, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2018/09/08/
what-if-john-mccain-had-picked-joe-lieberman-in-2008/; Arlette Saenz & Sarah
Mucha, Joe Biden Says He Would Consider a Republican for His Running Mate,
CNN (Dec. 30, 2019, 4:34 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/30/politics/joebiden-running-mate-republican/index.html.
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from which they can select a running mate, but they nevertheless
seek out candidates who can similarly balance the ticket.151 Although it is possible to choose someone who had previously sought
the party’s nomination for governor,152 the practical effect of candidate filing deadlines means the previous rival-turned-running mate
would need to end their campaign prior to appearing on a ballot.
Third, states with separate primaries for governor and lieutenant
governor are less likely to produce balanced tickets,153 likely because the ticket is being formed naturally, with little outside influence and no specific design. It’s theoretically possible for presumptive gubernatorial nominees (or those unopposed in their party’s primary) to exert their influence in the lieutenant-gubernatorial primary, but these efforts are not guaranteed success. One of the few
instances in which this influence played out publicly154 was in the
2006 Pennsylvania lieutenant-gubernatorial Democratic primary, in
which Lieutenant Governor Catherine Baker Knoll was seeking renomination in a contested primary.155 Joe Hoeffel, who had represented suburban Philadelphia in Congress before unsuccessfully
running for the U.S. Senate in 2004, considered challenging Baker
Knoll in the primary.156 Incumbent Governor Ed Rendell, however,
151

See Martinez, supra note 146, at 86–87.
E.g., Jessie Balmert, Mike DeWine to Name Jon Husted as Running Mate,
CIN. ENQUIRER (Nov. 29, 2017, 9:39 PM), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2017/11/29/unity-ticket-mike-dewine-name-jonhusted-running-mate/907479001/; Seth A. Richardson, Richard Cordray and
Betty Sutton Announce Joint Ohio Gubernatorial Ticket, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan.
10, 2018), https://www.cleveland.com/open/2018/01/richard_cordray_and_
betty_sutt.html.
153
E.g., Hennings & Urbatsch, supra note 116, at 297–98 (“[G]ubernatorial
appointment produces women nominees more often [for lieutenant governor] than
does primary election.”).
154
In 2018, it was reported that incumbent Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf
successfully worked behind the scenes to defeat his Lieutenant Governor, Michael
Stack, in the Democratic primary by informally backing a candidate from a different region of the state. See Christine Vendel, Pa. Lt. Gov Mike Stack Lost Primary Race Because of Geography, Not Scandals: Spokesman, PENNLIVE.COM
(May 16, 2018), https://www.pennlive.com/politics/2018/05/pa_lt_gov_mike_
stack_john_fett.html.
155
Amy Worden, Hoeffel Relents on Lieutenant Governor Race, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 9, 2006, at B1, B6.
156
Id.
152
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pressured Hoeffel not to challenge Baker Knoll in the primary.157
Rendell persuaded Hoeffel that the ticket needed to be geographically balanced and that the combination of Rendell, the former
Mayor of Philadelphia, and Baker Knoll, from Pittsburgh, adequately balanced the ticket.158 It is also significantly harder, although theoretically possible in limited circumstances,159 for a team
ticket of former rivals to merge in states with separate primaries.
Outside of these rare public insider-driven efforts to balance a
ticket, individual voters casting ballots in each primary may well
seek to “balance” their ballot by choosing candidates with different
backgrounds,160 but they are certainly under no obligation to do so.
Moreover, the results of one election—which primary voters cannot
possibly know beforehand—seem as though they would affect voters’ choice in the second election. That is, if voters knew that they
were choosing a running mate for a specific gubernatorial nominee,
and not choosing a lieutenant-gubernatorial nominee in the abstract,
they might vote differently.
Gubernatorial nominees’ loss of control over the composition of
their ticket extends beyond the inability to balance—it can, however, also stick gubernatorial nominees with controversial running
mates and no obvious way to replace them on the ticket.161 The most
prominent example of this occurred in Illinois in 1986, when former
U.S. Senator Adlai Stevenson III won the Democratic primary for
governor and Mark Fairchild won the primary for lieutenant governor.162 Fairchild’s nomination caused a significant amount of controversy, given that he was a member of the LaRouche movement,
an ideologically extreme, cult-like movement.163 Refusing to run on
157

Id.
See id.
159
E.g., Anne Hillman, Walker, Mallott Form Unity Ticket to Oppose Parnell,
ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.alaskapublic.org/
2014/09/02/walker-mallott-form-unity-ticket-to-oppose-parnell/.
160
See Hennings & Urbatsch, supra note 116, at 294 (noting that “the voting
public’s explicit demand for gender balance in nominations is often weak”).
161
See Andrew H. Malcolm, 2 Conservative Extremists Upset Democrats in
the Illinois Primary, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/20/us/2-conservative-extremists-upset-democrats-in-the-illinois-primary.html.
162
Id.
163
Id.
158
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the same ticket with Fairchild, Stevenson surrendered the Democratic nomination for governor and instead founded the Illinois Solidarity Party, which effectively replaced the Democratic Party in the
1986 election.164
A similar event took place in 2010, also in Illinois, when incumbent Governor Pat Quinn won the Democratic gubernatorial primary
and businessman Scott Lee Cohen won the lieutenant-gubernatorial
primary.165 Shortly after Cohen won the primary, media attention
focused on past allegations of domestic abuse levied against him,
and Quinn apparently moved behind the scenes to have Cohen withdraw.166 Cohen did so shortly thereafter, and the legislature
promptly moved to toss its system of separate primaries, instead requiring gubernatorial candidates to pick running mates before the
primary.167
In opposing constitutional amendments for team-ticket gubernatorial elections, as mentioned previously, some politicians argued
that team-ticket elections would produce unqualified, incompetent
candidates for lieutenant governor.168 It is ironic that these arguments were correct—but only with respect to lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates selected by voters in primaries, the method of lieutenant-gubernatorial selection closest to the pre-team-ticket method.
It, instead, seems to be the case that, as the party’s control over the
process increases, more qualified candidates—and specifically
those who are likelier to balance the ticket—are selected.
C.
The Rationale Behind These Changes
In embracing different methods of team-ticket formation—especially pre- and post-primary selection—many state legislators articulated arguments similar to those made in support of team-ticket
164

See Karl D. Cooper, Note, Are State-Imposed Political Party Primaries
Constitutional? The Constitutional Ramifications of the 1986 Illinois LaRouche
Primary Victories, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 343, 348–54 (1987–88).
165
John Patterson & Joseph Ryan, Quinn Hints at Replacement for Running
Mate, DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights, Ill.) (Feb. 4, 2010), https://www.dailyherald.com/article/20100205/news/302059951/.
166
Id.; Amanda Vinicky, Illinois’ Storied History of Choosing Its Second-inCommand, NPR ILL. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.nprillinois.org/post/illinoisstoried-history-choosing-its-second-command.
167
Vinicky, supra note 166.
168
Single Ballot Amendment up to Voters, supra note 18.
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elections. Policymakers focused on ensuring that governors and
lieutenant governors would have positive, constructive relationships, suggesting that allowing gubernatorial candidates to pick lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates would make such relationships likelier.169 These relationships, in turn, would allow governors to feel
comfortable delegating additional responsibilities to their lieutenant
governors.170 In some cases, observers perceived these moves as responses to chilly relationships between governors and lieutenant
governors who had been nominated in separate primaries171—and in
this context, the protestations of legislators and governors that this
wasn’t the motivation seemed particularly insincere.172 These arguments, which are rooted in the desire to create a cohesive state executive branch, echo the arguments made in favor of adopting teamticket constitutional amendments.173
Outside of the cohesion that deliberate selection of running mates would foster, legislators frequently argued that the selection process would produce higher-quality running mates.174 For example,
in Indiana, backers of a post-primary selection process suggested
that requiring lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates to run in primaries
forced them to fundraise, which they were not able to do well.175
Similarly, in Nebraska, the author of a constitutional amendment
169

See e.g., Amendment 1, LINCOLN J. STAR, Nov. 2, 2000, at 19X; Constitutional Change Bill Approved in House, ST. CLOUD TIMES, Apr. 17, 1973, at 5;
Tom Diemer, Rhodes Signs Industrial Tax Abatement Bill, MARION STAR, Dec.
10, 1977, at 2; Orr Favors Picking Lt. Governor Via Convention, DAILY REP.
(Greenfield, Ind.), Apr. 24, 1981, at 4.
170
E.g., Lt. Gov. Candidates Won’t Run Campaigns, DAILY SENTINEL (Grand
Junction, Colo.), Feb. 16, 2000, at 10; Martha Stoddard, Three Issues Are Getting
Little Notice, LINCOLN J. STAR, Oct. 3, 2000, at 7.
171
See, e.g., Foley, supra note 118; Owens Says Rogers Would Top List of
Potential Running Mates, DAILY SENTINEL (Grand Junction, Colo.), June 6, 2000,
at 3.
172
E.g., Lt. Gov. Candidates Won’t Run Campaigns, supra note 170 (“[Representatives] Sinclair and McPherson both have said that public conflicts between
Gov. Bill Owens and Lt. Gov. Joe Rogers did not prompt them to introduce their
measures.”); Owens Says Rogers Would Top List of Potential Running Mates, supra note 171 (“‘This bill was not Bill Owens trying to put aside Joe Rogers,’ the
governor said Monday.”).
173
Compare supra notes 169–70, with supra notes 104–05.
174
See, e.g., Orr Favors Picking Lt. Governor Via Convention, supra note
169; Stoddard, supra note 170.
175
See Orr Favors Picking Lt. Governor Via Convention, supra note 169.
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abolishing separate primaries noted that, in watching lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates launch campaigns in the 1998 election, he
saw “candidates waging expensive advertising wars, in which they
made overstated claims about what they would do.”176
The implication behind these arguments was perhaps that the affirmative requirement of launching a campaign, fundraising, and
generating a campaign platform both discouraged qualified candidates from running and created an electoral process that incentivized
wealthier candidates, or those with better connections and fundraising abilities, over others. This argument was made more explicitly
in Colorado, where supporters of post-primary selection noted that
removing the separate-primary requirement would allow more political outsiders to be selected as running mates.177 And the most
significant advantage of post-primary selection over pre-primary selection—the ability of nominees to pick former competitors as running mates—was raised as states considered efforts to adopt postprimary selection procedures.178
Despite the fact that either pre- or post-primary selection would
create a process more similar to presidential elections, few arguments were explicitly made to that effect.179 The absence of such
arguments, which were not-infrequently raised during the adoption
of team-ticket constitutional amendments,180 is an interesting omission. It perhaps suggests that, although states were concerned with
creating a process similar to presidential elections in the first place,
their adoption of specific procedures actually reflected state-specific
176

Stoddard, supra note 170.
See Peter Blake, Bill Lets Gubernatorial Candidates Pick Running Mates,
DAILY SENTINEL (Grand Junction, Colo.), Feb. 16, 2000, at 4 (suggesting that bill
would allow outsiders to be involved in process).
178
E.g., Bill Would Change Pick of Lieutenant Governor, MUNCIE STAR
PRESS, Jan. 15, 1981, at 10 (“Townsend . . . said the proposed change would allow
the nominee to pick one of his primary foes as a running mate . . . .’ This would
be very similar to the way in which we chose our president and vice president,’
he said. ‘I think it would be a very worthwhile change.’”); Liewer, supra note 135
(describing how candidates for governor would be allowed “to run in the primary
without choosing a running mate [for lieutenant governor], deferring a choice until after the primary so the winner could choose one of the losing candidates.”).
179
But see Bill Would Change Pick of Lieutenant Governor, supra note 178;
Stoddard, supra note 170.
180
See supra notes 89, 109, and accompanying discussion.
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786

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:751

concerns and was rooted in the historical differences between presidential and gubernatorial elections.
Few explicit arguments were made for separate primaries—
chiefly because few states affirmatively adopted these procedures
after ratifying team-ticket constitutional amendments. In many
cases, pre-existing election-law procedures, which obviously provided for separate primaries, continued in force, modified slightly
by the force of the constitutional amendments.181 Nevertheless, arguments were made in defense of separate-primary nominating procedures as other procedures were considered. These arguments,
which emphasized the importance of the popular, democratic support for lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates182 and suggested that
another procedure would allow behind-the-scenes selection of running mates,183 actually sound similar to the arguments made against
the adoption of team-ticket constitutional amendments.184
Ultimately, however, the debates surrounding these proposals
took place in something of a vacuum. To the extent that voters crystallized these proposals by approving the constitutional amendments, little opposition to them developed and public attention was
largely focused on other aspects of the proposed amendments.185
And if adopted as statutory amendments, the bills were usually approved with large, bipartisan majorities.186
D.
Identifying the Trend
The adoption of team-ticket constitutional amendments by New
York in 1953 inaugurated a new majority rule for gubernatorial
181

See, e.g., Act of Mar. 15, 1965, ch. 86, 1965 S.D. Laws 197.
See Diemer, supra note 169; Editorial, Election Preview, BANNER-PRESS
(David City, Neb.), Oct. 19, 2000, at 24; Foley, supra note 118; Orr Favors Picking Lt. Governor Via Convention, supra note 169.
183
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amendment has emerged . . . .”); Liewer, supra note 135 (largely discussing openprimary aspect of Florida’s Amendment 11, not post-primary selection of lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees).
186
See, e.g., Tandem Primary Given Final OK, MANSFIELD NEWS-J., Dec. 7,
1977, at 17.
182

2021]

ONE VOTE, TWO WINNERS

787

elections. Today, most states with lieutenant governors elect their
governors and lieutenant governors on a team ticket.187 But, as the
foregoing discussion makes clear, the adoption of team-ticket elections necessitated another decision by state legislators—specifically, how to implement the new electoral process.
Although most states initially adopted, either affirmatively or as
the result of pre-existing requirements, separate primaries, a clear
trend has developed away from separate primaries and toward preor post-primary selection of running mates by gubernatorial nominees. There are several ways to visualize this trend. First, we can
consider how state constitutional amendments adopting team-ticket
requirements were drafted. The later amendments are likelier than
the first amendments to provide for the pre- or post-primary nomination of lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees.188 Of the first ten states
to enact such amendments, eight still require separate primaries.189
Similarly, of the last ten states to enact such amendments, every one
forms team tickets either before or after primaries—none do so with
separate primaries.190
Second, we can consider how states drafted enabling acts. The
first constitutional amendments were likelier to be followed up with
separate-primary requirements than more recently ratified amendments.191 Third, we can look to what the most recent changes to lieutenant-gubernatorial selection have entailed. No state has transitioned from pre- or post-primary selection to separate primaries, but
six states have done the reverse.192
But under the hood, there’s another, albeit less discernible, trend
taking place. In recent decades, states have increasingly adopted the
post-primary selection of lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees. Almost all of the states that currently employ post-primary selection
have implemented their procedure in the last two decades: Iowa
(1988); Florida (1998); Colorado and Nebraska (2000); New Jersey
187
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189
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(2005); South Carolina (2018); and Kentucky (2020).193 Before this
period, the only states with post-primary selection were Indiana,
which had post-primary selection from 1981–97; Michigan, which
adopted post-primary selection in its 1963 constitution; and South
Dakota, which effectively nominated its lieutenant-gubernatorial
candidates post-primary anyway.194
Significantly, the states that have embraced post-primary selection of lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees have not done so after trying and rejecting each of the previous methods; accordingly, their
systems do not reflect a rejection of the other methods as much as
they represent an endorsement of their own specific method. The
adoption of these changes has reflected a concrete desire to ensure
that the relationships between the gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees—and thus governors and lieutenant governors—remain positive and to guarantee that governors can have a
junior governing partner of their choosing with as few restrictions
as possible.
IDENTIFYING THE OPTIMAL TEAM TICKET
IV.
The two separate trends identified in this Article—first, the trend
toward team-ticket elections and, second, the trend toward pre- and
post-primary running-mate selection—make clear that states are
seeking to modernize their gubernatorial elections in a democratically optimal way. The past rigidity of gubernatorial elections, usually for short terms, without lieutenant governors, and with a relegated role in the state system of government, has been largely abandoned.
But, in adopting team-ticket gubernatorial elections, which
method of ticket formation is the best? This Part argues that the three
different methods do not have equal merits and demerits to them.
Instead, while pre- and post-primary selection each have mutually
exclusive advantages and are roughly equal in their practical operation, separate primaries represent an archaic form of selection that
makes little sense in the realm of team-ticket formation.
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Based on the available legislative history identified in the previous parts, Part IV.A. extracts two philosophies underlying the adoption of team tickets: (1) efficiency in the state executive branch and
(2) maximization of democratic legitimacy and voter intent. Part
IV.B. then analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of each
method of team-ticket formation with these philosophies in mind,
ultimately concluding that separate primaries should be abolished.
A.
The Philosophy of Team-Ticket Elections
Both advocates and opponents of team-ticket constitutional
amendments made arguments rooted in ideals of democracy and the
republic. Advocates argued that the election of governors and lieutenant governors of different parties made possible a gubernatorial
succession that radically reshaped state politics, likely in a way not
intended by voters.195 They argued that a cohesive executive
branch—in which the governor and lieutenant governor got along,
worked together, and sought to advance a joint legislative agenda—
made for better government.196 Implicit in their argument was the
idea that voters should voluntarily surrender their power to elect
governors and lieutenant governors of different parties because doing so—while nominally undemocratic—would more practically
advance democracy.
These arguments sound quite similar to the arguments made by
“short ballot” advocates during the Progressive era.197 The “short
ballot” movement “reflected both a cynical and realistic view of how
elections were conducted—there are so many elections that take
place and so many positions voted on at each election that voters
don’t know what they’re voting for.”198 Accordingly, the movement
sought to reduce the number of offices elected by voters and to
“make politics so simple that what the average citizen knows will be
all there is to know.”199
Although short-ballot advocates apparently did not argue for the
adoption of team-ticket elections, they usually sought to preserve
195
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the lieutenant governorship as an elected office, even as they advocated for the appointment of otherwise-elected statewide officers.200
The root of the argument is similar: Voters are generally familiar
with the major-party nominees for governor but not many other offices and, accordingly, they cast their ballots with little information
at their disposal.201 In separately electing lieutenant governors, it is
unsurprising that few voters have access to information about lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates.202 Accordingly, the original advocates of team-ticket gubernatorial elections sought, as short-ballot
advocates did half a century prior, to persuade voters to give up
some of their voting power in exchange for a more competently run
and efficient government.203
Opponents, meanwhile, leaned much more heavily on arguments favoring “pure” democracy.204 They cast doubt on the ability
of political parties or gubernatorial nominees to select lieutenantgubernatorial candidates as effectively as the voters could, frequently invoking loaded imagery of smoke-filled rooms and
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manipulated processes.205 A related argument was that lieutenantgubernatorial candidates would be selected because of their ability
to help the ticket win—either through self-financing of the ticket or
by balancing it—and not because of their competence.206 These opponents contended that if a governor and lieutenant governor of different parties were elected, that was the electorate’s will—and if a
governor was succeeded by a lieutenant governor of a different
party, that was also the electorate’s will.207 At the core of these arguments was an unbridled, untainted belief that the outcome favored
by the electorate was the correct one and that efforts to impose an
ostensibly more “efficient” outcome were illegitimate as a result.208
These arguments contain some amount of internal inconsistency.
After all, the idea that lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates could be
selected in such a manner as to improve a ticket’s chances of winning a general election suggests that voters want a balanced ticket.
And the idea that doing so reduces the chances of competent candidates being selected—but, again, increases the ticket’s chances—
suggests that voters may not actually be able to critically discern
competence and effectiveness.
It is also worth noting that many of the arguments made against
team-ticket elections were empirical statements made without the
benefit of empirical support. One lawmaker in Iowa suggested, for
example, that female lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees would be
less likely to be selected by party elites than by the voters,209 but the
best available political science research actually suggests the opposite.210 And the claims that voters might be deliberately electing
governors and lieutenant governors of different parties—perhaps to
“mix and match” the best candidates from both parties211—is belied
by the fact that state electoral systems make it all too possible for
candidates of different parties to be elected by happenstance.212
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Moreover, to the extent that opponents of team tickets sought to
cloak their arguments in the guise of popular will, the fact that almost every proposed constitutional amendment providing for team
tickets was ratified strongly suggests that the electorate was entirely
willing to surrender a piece of its ability to vote for a particular office. These election outcomes were not flukes—in almost all cases,
large majorities of the electorate approved the amendments, regardless of whether they were presented individually, as part of an executive-branch rewrite, or as a newly drafted constitution.213 Accordingly, although it is somewhat dicey to attribute the underlying philosophy of the drafters of these constitutional amendments to the
voters who approved them, it is difficult to conclude that voters approved them for any reason but trading a little bit of democracy in
the abstract for significantly more democratic legitimacy in practice.
It is with this philosophy in mind that we should evaluate the different methods of lieutenant-gubernatorial selection.
B.
Evaluating Team-Ticket Election Procedures
With the three different team-ticket methods used in roughly
equal numbers among the states, their advantages and disadvantages
become apparent. There is, however, little that can be noted here that
has not been adequately covered elsewhere. The benefits and drawbacks of each method should be fairly apparent.
Separate primaries imbue the process of lieutenant-gubernatorial selection with faux democratic legitimacy. In so doing, however,
they effectively function as a double-blind experiment in which voters select gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates to
form a joint ticket in a vacuum, even though the selection of each
candidate ought to be influenced by the identity of the other. (Put
another way, how can a voter know who the ideal running mate for
their party’s gubernatorial nominee is without knowing the identity
of the gubernatorial nominee? And vice-versa?) Moreover, a system
of separate primaries seems more likely to produce fraught relationships between gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial
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nominees—giving a great deal of realism to the term “shotgun marriage.”214
Post-primary selection stands diametrically opposed to separate
primaries. In this system, voters have no direct say in the selection
of lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees.215 This does not mean that
they have no influence in the process, however. After all, they selected the gubernatorial nominee—whose decision as to a running
mate then completes the ticket—and the nominee should be conscientious of how the lieutenant-gubernatorial nominee will either electrify or deflate the party’s base voters. Unlike in states with the separate-primaries method, gubernatorial nominees in states with this
method have the ability to select almost any running mate of their
choosing.216 If they want to select a former opponent for their party’s
nomination in an effort to unify the party, they can do so.
Pre-primary selection occupies the space between separate primaries and post-primary selection. Like separate primaries, it ensures that the team ticket has the explicit support of primary voters.
And like post-primary selection, it ensures that every gubernatorial
candidate has the ability to name a running mate of their choosing.
But it also meaningfully differs from both of those methods. Voters
are deprived of their ability to vote for a specific lieutenant-gubernatorial candidate; so too are gubernatorial candidates deprived of
their ability to pick any potential running mate.
To some extent, the choice between methods of lieutenant-gubernatorial selection, and thus team-ticket formation, presents an
empirical question. The available political science research shows
that when team tickets are formed by selection, not separate primaries, the resulting ticket is more likely to be balanced and to have

214
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gender and racial equity.217 Not only that, but deliberately formed
tickets are also likelier to result in policy cooperation between the
elected governor and lieutenant governor.218
More anecdotally, the spectacle of open lieutenant-gubernatorial
elections—in which voters know little of the candidates and the candidates are both poorly funded and forced to make impossible campaign promises—leaves much to be desired. And separate primaries
seem to require more machinations on the part of politicians and
powerbrokers, not less. The examples from Illinois in 1986 and
2010, when lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates unacceptable to the
gubernatorial nominee were nominated,219 is reflective of the unintended consequences of separately nominating lieutenant governors.
But deciding among pre- or post-primary selection presents a
closer question. Is slightly limiting the gubernatorial candidate’s
ability to select any possible running mate worth the marginal increase in voter input on the ticket formation? In the reverse, is marginally limiting voter input worth a slight increase in the candidate’s
ability to select any running mate? The fundamental operation of
each system has slight advantages and disadvantages over the other.
And, more significantly, each system might have small effects on
how gubernatorial elections are conducted that might only matter at
the margins. For example, pre-primary selection might force the
number of gubernatorial candidates competing in either party’s primary to consolidate and shrink—as occurred in the 2018 Ohio gubernatorial election in both primaries.220 This consolidation could
reduce the chances that a gubernatorial candidate wins their party’s
primary with a small plurality of the vote. Post-primary selection
might enable candidates to make cross-party selections, opening up
every political journalist’s fantasy scenario: a Democrat and a
217
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Republican forming a “dream team.” These suggestions represent
unanswered empirical questions, however, and are worth addressing
in future scholarship.
All of this is to say that policymakers in different states, each
operating with the same ethos and each cognizant of the philosophies of democratic legitimacy and governmental efficiency undergirding team-ticket elections, could arrive at different—and wellreasoned—decisions. Because the merits of both pre- and post-primary selection of lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees are compelling,
with each possessing advantages over the other, this Article does not
seek to prescribe either one of them as an answer. Instead, conscientious that states are laboratories of democracy and may reach different conclusions, it is satisfied to set out each method’s advantages
and disadvantages—but ultimately to urge that states pick one of
them.
CONCLUSION
Over the past half-century, states have increasingly consolidated
their gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial elections. These
changes have been addressed sparingly in the scholarly literature
surrounding gubernatorial elections and state constitutional law, but
they represent a significant shift in the balance of power at the state
level. Somewhat paradoxically, the move to team tickets seeks to
sacrifice a small amount of direct democracy—namely, the electorate’s ability to select a lieutenant governor entirely of its choosing—for a larger amount of democratic legitimacy in the form of a
democratically legitimate gubernatorial succession and the conversion of the lieutenant governor to a reliable governing partner. A
similar motivation has supported the transition to methods of lieutenant-gubernatorial election that are ostensibly less democratic but
have similar effects.
These efforts have dramatically reshaped how gubernatorial
elections take place in the United States. But this movement is not
yet over. Although most states with lieutenant governors today employ methods of lieutenant-gubernatorial election that create a team
ticket, many still do not. And in those states, some state legislatures
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have proposed constitutional amendments that seek to make similar
changes.221
While there are meritorious arguments in favor of either pre- or
post-primary selection, separate primaries are fundamentally at odds
with the rationale underlying team-ticket gubernatorial elections.
Accordingly, these proposed amendments ought to be adopted, and
separate primaries ought to be abolished.
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APPENDIX
State
Pennsylvania
Maryland
Kansas
South Dakota
Utah
Kentucky
New Jersey

New York
New Mexico
Connecticut
Hawai’i
Massachusetts
Wisconsin
Colorado
Nebraska
Minnesota
North Dakota
Indiana
Ohio
Iowa
South Carolina
Alaska
Michigan
Florida
Illinois
Montana

Team-Ticket Constitutional Amendment Adoption
Team-Ticket
Vote
Year
Amendment Type
Amendment
Percentage
Amendment 5
1967
66.05%
Executive Branch Rewrite
(1967)
Question 1
1970
63.95%
Executive Branch Rewrite
(1970)
Amendment 2
1972
60.56%
Executive Branch Rewrite
(1972)
Amendment B
1972
65.28%
Executive Branch Rewrite
(1972)
Proposition 1
1980
56.00%
Executive Branch Rewrite
(1980)
Amendment 2
1992
51.13%
Executive Branch Rewrite
(1992)
Question 1
2005
55.60%
Executive Branch Rewrite
(2005)
Amendment 3
(1953)
Amendment 13
(1962)
Question 3
(1962)
Proposal 2
(1964)
Question 1
(1966)
Question 5
(1967)
Measure 1
(1968)
Amendment 13b
(1970)
Amendment 3
(1972)
Amendment 1
(1974)
Amendment 2
(1974)
Amendment 1
(1976)
Amendment 1
(1988)
Amendment 1
(2012)
1956 Constitution
1963 Constitution
1968 Constitution
1970 Constitution
1972 Constitution

1953

56.00%

1962

65.03%

1962

80.84%

1964

72.13%

1966

73.19%

1967

61.90%

1968

67.73%

1970

56.06%

1972

67.90%

1974

55.27%

1974

56.25%

1976

61.16%

1988

66.62%

2012

55.51%

1956
1963
1968
1970
1972

68.12%
50.22%
55.42%
57.25%
50.54%

Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Specific Team-Ticket
Amendment
Whole Constitution
Whole Constitution
Whole Constitution
Whole Constitution
Whole Constitution

Average Support for Executive Branch Rewrite Amendment
Average Support for Specific Team-Ticket Amendment

Year
1967
1970
1972
1972
1980
1992
2005

1953
1962
1962
1964
1966
1967
1968
1970
1972
1974
1974
1976
1988
2012
1959
1963
1968
1970
1972
59.80%
63.97%

